Even Arthur Giuliani, who set up his office at American headquarters in Berlin-Zehlendorf, couldn't deny his fascination with the unusual circumstances: "It is utterly impossible to realize the completeness of Berlin's destruction," he wrote to Harry J. Anslinger in Washington. "Perhaps after years, a fair amount of information can be dug out of the cellars where it now lies buried under the tons of debris which once constituted the buildings above it—but that time is not yet in sight." He kept himself busy, confiscating something here, arresting someone there, and sending photos back to FBN headquarters as proof of his activities. The photos captured a pair of women's shoes with hollowed-out heels for hiding narcotics, car doors with armrests full of drugs, potatoes with their insides removed. A Hershey's cocoa tin filled with cocaine. A ladies' slip soaked in heroin solution. A book with a hole carved into its pages that in lieu of reading material offered a different kind of food for the brain.
In reality, however, such minor investigative successes had little effect. The problem was structural in nature. After the old National Socialist authorities had ceased to exist, a vacuum had opened up for the illegal dealers to exploit. How was Giuliani supposed to remedy the situation? Then one day hope arrived from an unsuspected source. He received a letter from a former Gestapo agent by the name of Werner Mittelhaus. "It is a long time my intention to write to you because I wish to tell you about the activity of the 'Reichszentrale zur Bekampfung [sic] von Rauschgiftvergehen' during the last years of the war." It was there, at the Reich Headquarters for Combating Narcotic Crime, that Mittelhaus had been employed, and in his accented English he voiced a wish: "I myself would like very much to work again in drug offices...I suppose, you will have an interest on such a work in Germany, and I would be glad, if I could cooperate in a common combat of the drug smuggle." He concluded his offer by saying, "I was never a member of the SS, only a member of the NSDAP on order of my department. The proof of my anti-Nazi positions are in my hands."
The offer presented Giuliani with an ethical problem: Would he accept help from a former Nazi, profit from his expertise, let the man tell him how to police the streets of Berlin? It was a dilemma that the other Western allies were also caught up in, whereas the Russians made no compromises on this point. Giuliani discussed the idea with Anslinger, who had no scruples about it and gave the green light from Washington. "You might check up on Mittelhaus as being possible good material for our organization." From Gestapo to FBN.
In fact, the head of the FBN admired the defunct Nazi regime for its strict policy of prohibition. "The situation in Germany...was entirely satisfactory," he wrote. In contrast to the chaotic Weimar Republic, the Nazis had kept their house in order. "During 1939, for instance, and as compared with 1924, this decrease [in the consumption of drugs] amounted to 25% in the case of morphine, 10% in the case of cocaine," Anslinger noted. "Thanks to the careful supervision, smuggling [was] practically impossible." Indeed, "narcotic law enforcement is believed to have been very efficient in pre-war Germany." In November 1945 Anslinger had praised the old Nazi drug laws as a model for America: These were "stricter" and had a "better constitutional basis than our own," for which reason he resolved to study the control mechanisms used in Germany and in the German-occupied countries and territories during the war. His goal: "The old and successful German opium legislation [should] become operative again as quickly as possible and be applied with the same severity as in the past."
The Nazis had made quick work of drug-users, packing them off to concentration camps—for Anslinger a welcome approach. The high-ranking American government official clearly wasn't bothered by the ideological thrust of the Nazi drug war, by its being directed against Jews, with their supposedly higher level of drug consumption. He openly acknowledged his own racism, once describing a Black informant with a racial epithet in a letter to FBN district supervisors. Another characteristic statement of Anslinger's is this one made before the US Congress: "Reefer makes darkies think they're as good as white men." It's no surprise that in Washington he was openly referred to by the nickname "Mussolini"—and not just on account of his unfortunate appearance.
For Giuliani, making contact with the ex-Gestapo agent proved difficult: By this point Mittelhaus, the former officer of the once feared Reich Main Security Office (Reichssicherheitshauptamt), which had operated under the direction of Heinrich Himmler, head of the SS, had resettled in Kiel to avoid being arrested by the Russians. The British military was stationed up there on the coast, and it, too, expressed interest in working with him.
"I spoke to the British Zonal Safety Officers, who communicated with their office at Kiel," Giuliani wrote to Anslinger. "He [Mittelhaus] will probably be re-employed by the German Criminal Police in the British Zone when he is cleared." The Brits described their catch as "undoubtedly efficient and reliable," and his connections as "amazing." Giuliani's conclusion: "The British have no intention of turning him loose, which is both understandable and reasonable, considering the personnel problem all over Germany." Also urgent was the Western Allies' belief that they required the help of former Nazi functionaries to keep German society running. Finding personnel was no easy task.
